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Contemporary econometric literature has generated a large number of stories of the relationship between how 
much foreign aid a countries receives and how it grows. All the stories hinge on the statistical significance in 
cross-country regressions of a quadratic term involving aid. Among the stories are that aid raises growth (on aver-
age) 1) in countries where economic policies are good; 2) in countries where policies are good and a civil war re-
cently ended; 3) in all countries, but with diminishing returns; 4) in countries outside the tropics; 5) in countries 
with difficult economic environments, characterized by declining or volatile terms of trade, natural disasters, or 
low population; or 6) when aid increases in countries experiencing negative export price shocks. The diversity of 
results prima facie suggests that many are fragile. Easterly et al. (2004) find the aid-policy story (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000) to be fragile in the face of an expansion of the data set in years and countries. The present study ex-
pands that analysis by applying more tests, and to more studies. Each test involves altering just one aspect of the 
regressions. All 19 tests are derived from sources of variation that are minimally arbitrary. Twelve derive from 
specification differences between studies, what Leamer (1983) calls “whimsy.” Three derive from doubts about 
the appropriateness of the definition of one variable in one study. The remaining four derive from the passage of 
time, which allows sample expansion. This design allows an examination of the role of “whimsy” in the results 
that are tested while minimizing “whimsy” in the testing itself. Among the stories examined, the aid-policy link 
proves weakest, while the aid-tropics link is most robust. 
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Abstract: Contemporary econometric literature has generated a large number of stories of the relation-
ship between how much foreign aid a countries receives and how it grows. All the stories hinge on the 
statistical significance in cross-country regressions of a quadratic term involving aid. Among the stories 
are that aid raises growth (on average) 1) in countries where economic policies are good; 2) in countries 
where policies are good and a civil war recently ended; 3) in all countries, but with diminishing returns; 
4) in countries outside the tropics; 5) in countries with difficult economic environments, characterized by 
declining or volatile terms of trade, natural disasters, or low population; or 6) when aid increases in coun-
tries experiencing negative export price shocks. The diversity of results prima facie suggests that many 
are fragile. Easterly et al. (2004) find the aid-policy story (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) to be fragile in the 
face of an expansion of the data set in years and countries. The present study expands that analysis by 
applying more tests, and to more studies. Each test involves altering just one aspect of the regressions. All 
19 tests are derived from sources of variation that are minimally arbitrary. Twelve derive from specifica-
tion differences between studies, what Leamer (1983) calls “whimsy.” Three derive from doubts about the 
appropriateness of the definition of one variable in one study. The remaining four derive from the passage 
of time, which allows sample expansion. This design allows an examination of the role of “whimsy” in 
the results that are tested while minimizing “whimsy” in the testing itself. Among the stories examined, 
the aid-policy link proves weakest, while the aid-tropics link is most robust. 
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Introduction 
 
In the early weeks of 1981 economist Edward Leamer gave a speech at the University of 
Toronto, in which he bemoaned the state of econometrics. Econometrics sought the status of a 
science, with regressions its analog for the reproducible experiments of chemistry or physics. Yet 
an essential part of econometric “experiments” was too often arbitrary, opaque, and unrepeat-
able. Adapting the speech for the American Economic Review, he wrote: 
 
The econometric art as it is practiced at the computer terminal involves fitting many, perhaps 
thousands, of statistical models. One or several that the researcher finds pleasing are selected for 
reporting purposes. This search for a model is often well intentioned, but there can be no doubt 
that such a specification search invalidates the traditional theories of inference. The concepts of 
unbiasedness, consistency, efficiency, maximum-likelihood estimation, in fact, all the concepts of 
traditional theory, utterly lose their meaning by the time an applied researcher pulls from the 
bramble of computer output the one thorn of a model he likes best, the one he chooses to portray 
as a rose. 
… 
This is a sad and decidedly unscientific state of affairs we find ourselves in. Hardly anyone takes 
data analyses seriously. Or perhaps more accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data 
analyses seriously. Like elaborately plumed birds who have long since lost the ability to procreate 
but not the desire, we preen and strut and display our t-values. (Leamer, 1983) 
 
The way out of the quagmire, Leamer argued, was for econometricians to explore large regions 
of “specification space,” systematically analyzing the relationship between assumptions and con-
clusions: 
 
[A]n inference is not believable if it is fragile, if it can be reversed by minor changes in assump-
tions. As consumers of research, we correctly reserve judgment on an inference until it stands up 
to a study of fragility, usually by other researchers advocating opposite opinions. It is, however, 
much more efficient for individual researchers to perform their own sensitivity analyses, and we 
ought to be demanding much more complete and more honest reporting of the fragility of claimed 
inferences….The job of a researcher is then to report economically and informatively the map-
ping from assumptions into inferences. (Leamer, 1983) 
 
One econometric debate that has worrying hallmarks of Leamer’s syndrome is that on the 
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effectiveness of foreign aid to developing countries. Since Griffin and Enos (1970), econometri-
cians have parried over the question of how aid affects economic growth in recipient nations. 
Prominent in the contemporary work, Burnside and Dollar (2000) concluded, “aid has a positive 
effect on growth in a good policy environment,” presumably because good policies increase the 
productivity of aid-financed investment. Their evidence: the statistical significance in cross-
country panel growth regressions of an interaction term of total aid received and an indicator of 
the quality of recipient economic policies. 
The work of Burnside and Dollar has brought corroborations (Collier and Dehn, 2001; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Collier and Dollar, 2002, 2004) and challenges. From the ongoing 
debate have emerged several stories of the relationship between aid and growth, each of which 
turns on a particular quadratic or cubic term involving aid. The stories are not incompatible, but 
most papers support only one, a few two. Hansen and Tarp (2001) find that entering the square 
of aid drives out the significance of Burnside and Dollar’s aid×policy, and makes the simple aid 
term significant too: aid works on average, but with diminishing returns. Guillaumont and Chau-
vet (2001) also fail to find significance for aid×policy, and instead offer evidence that aid works 
best in countries with difficult economic environments, characterized by volatile and declining 
terms of trade, low population, and natural disasters, perhaps because aid finances institutions 
that help cushion the shocks. In the same vein, Collier and Dehn (2001) find that increasing aid 
to countries experiencing negative export price shocks raises growth. Meanwhile, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) offer a triple-interaction term: aid works particularly well in countries that are 
recovering from civil war and that have good policies. Last, Hansen and Tarp, along with Dal-
gaard, tell a new story: aid raises growth outside the tropics but not in them, low latitudes appar-
ently being associated with some combination of inhospitable natural environments and poor 
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policies and institutions (Dalgaard et al., 2004). 
These papers naturally differ not only in their conclusions and policy implications but 
also their specifications. Within the group, there are two different choices of period length in the 
panel data sets, three definitions of “policy,” three of aid, and four choices of control variable set. 
Though probably none of the choices are truly made on a whim, these differences appear to be 
examples of what Leamer called “whimsy.” From Leamer’s point of view, the studies taken to-
gether represent a small and unsystematic sampling of specification space. Without further 
analysis, it is impossible to know whether the results reveal solid underlying regularities in the 
data or are fragile artifacts of “whimsy.” 
In this paper, I therefore examine the possibility of fragility in this literature systemati-
cally. Since by the laws of chance any regression can be broken with enough experimentation, it 
is essential for credibility that the testing suite itself be un-whimsical. I derive my tests therefore 
from three canonical sources of variation: the “whimsy” already present in the original specifica-
tions; doubts about the appropriateness of the definition of one variable, the Collier and Dehn 
negative shock variable; and the passage of time, which allows expansion of data sets. Each test 
ideally involves varying just one aspect of the regressions, although sometimes additional 
changes are made so that the modified regressions pass specification tests. In all, I subject 8 re-
gressions from 7 of the most prominent studies to this systematic test suite.  
The rest of this paper runs as follows. Section I places the recent empirical work on aid in 
historical context and reviews the approaches and conclusions of the studies that are tested for 
robustness. Section II describes the testing regime. Section III reports results. Section IV con-
cludes. 
I. History 
It can be said that foreign aid for poor countries was born on the steps of the U.S. Capitol just 
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after noon on January 20, 1949. At that moment, the re-elected President Harry Truman gave his 
inaugural address, in which he enunciated a historically novel vision of the relationship between 
the democratic west and what is now called the “developing world.” The poorer nations were no 
longer just colonies or sources of raw materials for the West to exploit, but potential allies in the 
Cold War, which must be won over to capitalism and democracy. By sharing its capital and tech-
nical know-how, the United States could make poor nations richer and expand the sphere of free-
dom. 
As Truman spoke, American assistance for the rapid, aid-financed redevelopment of 
Western Europe was already underway, and would soon succeed unambiguously. But the effec-
tiveness of aid for development in poorer countries has for decades been a point of intense con-
troversy. Bauer (1976), Hancock (1989), Easterly (2001), and Reusse (2002), among others, have 
pointed out how foreign assistance has been undermined by geopolitics, pressures from domestic 
commercial interests for contracts, arrogance and perverse incentives within aid-giving institu-
tions, and the sheer difficulty of fostering development from the outside. Against these criti-
cisms, defenders have pointed to successes such as the eradication of smallpox, the widespread 
vaccination of children against other diseases, and support for family planning that helped slow 
population growth. 
The hope has often arisen that a turn to the numbers would shed light on the contentious 
questions of whether and when aid works. Starting in 1970, cross-country empirics were brought 
to bear to examine how aid affects macro variables such as investment, growth, and poverty. In 
the view of Hansen and Tarp (2000), this literature has gone through three generations. The first 
generation essentially spanned 1970–72, and mainly investigated the aid-savings link. Influenced 
by the Harrod-Domar model, in which savings is the binding constraint on growth, aid-induced 
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saving was assumed to lead directly to investment, thence to growth via a fixed incremental capi-
tal-output ratio. Not considered were the realistic possibilities that some aid is consumed and that 
some invested aid has low, zero, even negative returns. The second generation of studies, which 
ran from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, avoided the simplistic assumptions about savings by 
directly investigating the relationship between aid on the one hand and investment and growth on 
the other. 
Hansen and Tarp argue that the preponderance of the evidence from these first two gen-
erations says that 1) aid increases total savings but less than one-to-one, partly substituting, 
partly complementing other sources of savings; and 2) that aid increases investment and growth. 
They suggest that studies with more pessimistic results, such as Mosley et al. (1987), have 
gained disproportionate attention despite being in the minority precisely because they are con-
trarian. 
The third generation commenced with Boone (1994) and continues to this day. It has 
brought several innovations. The data sets cover more countries and years. Reflecting the influ-
ence of the new growth theory, regressors are typically included to represent the economic and 
institutional environment (sometimes together called the “policy environment”). It has become 
the norm to address methodologically the potential endogeneity of aid and policy to growth, usu-
ally with two-stage least squares. And, finally, the aid-growth relationship is allowed to be non-
linear, through incorporation of such regressors as aid
2 and aid×policy. (Hansen and Tarp, 2000) 
The data sets are almost always panels. The studies I test for robustness all belong to the third 
generation. 
Burnside and Dollar disseminated their first results on aid effectiveness in 1997, as a 
World Bank working paper that eventually appeared in the American Economic Review (2000). 
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They test whether an interaction term of aid and an index of recipient economic policies is sig-
nificantly associated with growth. Their data set is a panel drawn from developing countries out-
side the former Eastern bloc, covering the six four-year periods in 1970–93. They incorporate 
some controls found significant in the general growth literature, namely: initial income (log real 
GDP/capita) to capture convergence; ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 
1997), assassinations/capita, and the product thereof; the Knack-Keefer (1995) institutional qual-
ity variable, called “ICRGE”; M2/GDP, l to indicate financial depth, lagged one period to avoid 
endogeneity (King and Levine, 1993); dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and fast-growing East 
Asia; and period dummies. 
Burnside and Dollar use a measure of aid called Effective Development Assistance 
(EDA), as computed by Chang et al. (1998). EDA differs in two major respects from the usual 
net Overseas Development Assistance measure (net ODA) tabulated by the Paris-based Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC). First, EDA excludes technical assistance, on the grounds 
that it funds not so much recipient governments as consultants. Second, it differs in its treatment 
of loans. Net ODA counts disbursements of concessional (low-interest) loans only, but at full 
face value.
1 It nets out principal but not interest payments on old loans because it is built on a 
capital flow concept. In contrast, EDA includes all disbursements of all development loans re-
gardless of how concessional they are (for example, near-commercial rate loans by the World 
Bank to middle-income countries such as Brazil), but counts only their grant element, that is, 
their net present value. To express EDA as a share of recipient GDP, Burnside and Dollar con-
vert it to constant 1985 dollars using the IMF’s world Export Unit Value Index, then divide into 
real GDP from Penn World Tables 5.5 (Summers and Heston, 1991). 
                                                 
1 DAC considers a loan concessional if it has a grant element of at least 25 percent of the loan value, using a 10 per-
cent discount rate. 
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To represent recipient economic policies with a single variable, Burnside and Dollar first 
run a growth regression without aid terms, but with all controls and three indicators of economic 
policy—log (1+inflation), budget balance/GDP, and the Sachs-Warner (1995) variable measur-
ing openness to trade. The coefficients of all three policy variables differ from 0 at the 0.05 level 
in this regression, so Burnside and Dollar form a linear combination of the three using the coeffi-
cients as weights. This is their policy index.
2 
When Burnside and Dollar run their base specification—containing the controls, the pol-
icy index, aid, and aid×policy—on their full data set, the term of central interest, aid×policy, 
does not in fact enter significantly, whether in OLS or in 2SLS with aid and aid×policy instru-
mented. However, they find that it becomes significant after either of two possible changes. Five 
outlier observations can be excluded (Burnside and Dollar’s preferred specification). Or a cubic 
term can be added—aid
2×policy, in which case both aid×policy and aid
2×policy appear signifi-
cant, the first with positive sign, the second negative. Burnside and Dollar famously conclude 
that aid raises growth in a good policy environment, but with diminishing returns. 
Burnside and Dollar’s work triggered responses in the literature, some critical, some sup-
portive. Hansen and Tarp (2001) make one prominent attack. They modify the Burnside and Dol-
lar 2SLS regressions in several ways, most importantly by adding an aid
2 term. Aid×policy is not 
significant in their results, but aid and aid
2 are, the first positive and the second negative. The 
implication is that aid is effective on average, but with diminishing returns—regardless of recipi-
ents’ policies as far as the evidence goes. Hansen and Tarp then criticize both the Burnside and 
Dollar regressions and their own 2SLS regressions for failing to handle several econometric 
problems. There may be unobserved country-level effects that correlate with both policies and 
growth. Failing to purge or control for all such effects could give spurious explanatory power to 
                                                 
2 They also add a constant term to the index, but this has no effect on the regression results of interest here. 
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policies and aid×policy. Also, variables other than aid and its interaction terms, such as fiscal 
balance, could be endogenous and ought to be instrumented. Thus they deploy the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator. This estimator runs in first differences, which purges country effects, and 
it allows the instrumentation of many variables, using their own lags. In switching to this “differ-
ence GMM” estimator, Hansen and Tarp also modify the regressor list. They drop fiscal balance 
as a policy variable. And they add ∆aid and ∆(aid
2). Hansen and Tarp’s key results on aid and 
aid
2 hold. And ∆aid and ∆(aid
2) are significant too, again the first with positive sign and the sec-
ond negative.  
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) tell a third story of aid effectiveness. They hypothesize 
that the economic vulnerability of a country influences aid effectiveness. They call economic 
vulnerability the “environment,” not to be confused with Burnside and Dollar’s “policy envi-
ronment.” In this story, aid flows stabilize countries that are particularly buffeted by terms of 
trade difficulties, other sorts of external shocks, or natural disasters. In the spirit of Burnside and 
Dollar, Guillaumont and Chauvet build an environment index out of four variables: volatility of 
agricultural value added (to proxy for natural disasters), volatility of export earnings, long-term 
terms of trade trend, and log of population (small countries being more vulnerable to external 
forces). Their specification is unique in this literature in using 12-year periods, and in its set of 
controls, which are partly inspired by Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992). They control for 
population growth, mean years of secondary school education among adults, a Barro-Lee meas-
ures of political instability based on assassinations and revolutions, ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion, and lagged M2/GDP. In their OLS and 2SLS regressions, aid×environment appears with the 
predicted negative sign, indicating that aid works better in countries with worse environments. 
The term also drives out the significance of aid×policy. 
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Other papers have reached conclusions similar to those of Burnside and Dollar. Collier 
and Dollar (2002) corroborate them with a quite different data set and specification. They use 
OLS only. They include former Eastern bloc countries, the Bahamas, and Singapore. They use 
net ODA rather than EDA. They study 1974–97 instead of 1970–93. They drop all Burnside and 
Dollar controls except log initial GDP/capita, ICRGE, and period dummies. They add region 
dummies.
3 And they define policy as the overall score from the World Bank’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which is a composite rating of countries on 20 aspects of 
policies and institutions.
4 
In a paper that takes the Collier and Dollar core regression as its starting point, Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) analyze how aid effectiveness is influenced by whether a country has re-
cently ended a civil war. Sticking to the four-year panel arrangement, they create three dummies 
to indicate how recently civil war ended. The dummy for “peace-onset” is 1 in the period when a 
country goes from civil war to peace. “Post-conflict 1” takes a value of 1 in the following period, 
and “post-conflict 2” in the period after that—assuming civil war does not recur. In Collier and 
Hoeffler’s preferred (OLS) specification, aid×policy×post-conflict 1 is significantly different 
from 0: aid works particularly well in a good policy environment a few years after conflict has 
ended. 
Also corroborating Burnside and Dollar, Collier and Dehn (2001) hew more closely to 
the Burnside and Dollar specification and data set, and tell a story that synthesizes elements from 
Burnside and Dollar and Guillaumont and Chauvet. They find that adding variables incorporat-
ing information on export shocks renders Burnside and Dollar’s preferred specification—the one 
                                                 
3 The regions are Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Southern Asia, East Asia and Pacific, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as defined by the World Bank. 
4 Collier and Hoeffler (2002) make a small correction to the Collier and Dollar data set, excluding 5 observations 
where a missing value had been treated as 0. I test the Collier and Hoeffler version of the Collier and Dollar regres-
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with aid×policy but not aid
2×policy—more robust to the inclusion of Burnside and Dollar’s five 
outliers. First, they add two variables indicating the magnitude of any positive or negative com-
modity export price shocks. Aid×policy is then significant at 0.01 for a regression on the full 
sample. The negative-shock variable is too, with the expected minus sign. Then Collier and Dehn 
add four aid-shock interaction terms: lagged aid×positive shock, lagged aid×negative shock, 
∆aid×positive shock, and ∆aid×negative shock. The first and last prove positive and significant 
in OLS, and the last, ∆aid×negative shock proves particularly robust in their testing. But includ-
ing the four raised the significance level of aid×policy to 0.08.
5 Still, the study provides some 
buttressing for Burnside and Dollar, and suggests that well-timed aid increases ameliorate nega-
tive export shocks. This matches the Guillaumont and Chauvet result in spirit. But where Guil-
laumont and Chauvet interact the amount of aid with the standard deviation of an index of export 
volume and other variables, Collier and Dehn’s significant interaction term involves the change 
in aid and the change in export prices.  
Most recently in the peer-reviewed literature, Dalgaard et al. (2004) tell a novel aid-
growth story. They focus on the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics as a determinant of 
both growth and the influence of aid on growth. This variable is indisputably free of the endoge-
neity worries that beset other variables advocated as determinants of aid effectiveness, such as 
inflation and export volume volatility. It surfaces as a growth determinant in the work of Jeffrey 
Sachs and others (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup and Sachs, 1999; Sachs, 2001, 2003). And the 
causal links between tropical location and growth may include institutions and economic policies 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003). Dalgaard et al. thus see tropical area as an 
                                                                                                                                                             
sion. 
5 I am able to reproduce exactly the results of the specification with the four interaction terms, in which aid×policy is 
marginally significant. That is the one tested below. But I am not able to reproduce their results for the variant in-
cluding only positive- and negative-shock terms. In my results, aid×policy has a t statistic of only 0.42. Yet the R
2 
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exogenous “deep determinant” of growth. In OLS, 2SLS, Arellano-Bond “difference GMM,” 
and Blundell-Bond “system GMM” regressions
6, aid and aid×tropical area fraction are quite sig-
nificant, the first with positive sign, the second with negative sign and similar magnitude. For 
countries in the tropics, the derivative of growth with respect to aid (the sum of the coefficients 
on aid and aid×tropical area fraction) is statistically indistinguishable from 0. Thus, on average, 
aid seems to work outside the tropics but not in them. The authors report that their new interac-
tion term drives out both aid×policy and aid
2. 
There are other third-generation studies. Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Durbarry et al. 
(1998), and Lensink and White (2001), all find evidence for Hansen and Tarp’s story of aid ef-
fectiveness. Svensson (1999) finds a positive interaction between aid and recipients’ level of de-
mocracy. Chauvet and Guillaumont (2002) enrich their earlier analysis, in draft form. In a work-
ing paper, Burnside and Dollar (2004) defend their earlier analysis with a radically different 
specification, a cross-section of countries rich and poor in the 1990s with minimal controls and a 
different definition of policy. 
In the present paper I focus on the studies already highlighted as being among the most 
influential and, with two exceptions, having been published in the peer-reviewed literature. The 
two exceptions are Collier and Dehn (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002), which are pillars of 
the peer-reviewed Collier and Dollar (2004). From 6 of these 7 studies, I test the single regres-
sion that appears to be the authors’ preferred one. From Hansen and Tarp (2001), I take two re-
gressions. One, an Arellano-Bond GMM regression, seems to be their preferred regression. I in-
                                                                                                                                                             
and sample size match theirs exactly. 
6 Blundell-Bond “system GMM” augments Arellano-Bond “difference GMM” by creating a system of equations, 
half in first differences, half in levels. In the difference equations, predetermined and endogenous variables are in-
strumented with lags of their own levels while in the levels equations they are instrumented with lags of their first 
differences. See Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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clude one of their 2SLS regressions too because it is most akin to the core specification in an im-
portant new study by Clemens et al. (2004). 
II.  The Test Suite 
A. The  Tests 
There is some robustness testing in the recent literature on aid-growth connections, albeit focus-
ing almost exclusively on Burnside and Dollar (2000). Lu and Ram (2001) introduce fixed ef-
fects into the Burnside and Dollar regressions. Ram (2004) splits the aid variable into the com-
ponents coming from bilateral and multilateral donors, and also tests alternative definitions of 
policy. Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) modify the choice of excluded outliers. Easterly et al. 
(2004) extend the data set to additional countries and an additional period, 1994–97. All these 
tests eliminate the key Burnside and Dollar (2000) result. 
The present study expands Easterly et al. work along two dimensions. It applies more 
tests. And it tests more studies. Table 1 details the regressions chosen for testing from the publi-
cations highlighted above. The regressions vary in type of estimator, control set, countries sam-
pled, length of periods within the panel, overall study timeframe, definitions of aid and policy, 
and treatment of outliers. They do appear to contain “whimsy.” 
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Table 1. Regressions tested 
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1As revised in Collier & Hoeffler 1.1. 
2As extrapolated to 1970–74 and 1996–97 in Easterly et al. (2004). 
Abbreviations: LGDP=log initial real GDP/capita; ETHNF=ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960; AS-
SAS=assassinations/capita; ICRGE=composite of International Country Risk Guide governance indica-
tors; M2=M2/GDP, lagged; SSA=Sub-Saharan Africa dummy; EASIA=fast-growing East Asia dummy; 
ENV=Guillaumont & Chauvet “environment” variable; SYR=mean years of secondary schooling among 
adults; PINSTAB=average of ASSAS and revolutions/year; BB=budget balance/GDP; 
INFL=log(1+inflation); SACW=Sachs-Warner openness; EDA=Effective Development Assistance; 
ODA=Net Overseas Development Assistance. 
 
The tests applied to these regressions constitute a systematic sampling of a larger region 
of specification space than has hitherto been examined in the aid-growth literature. To limit 
complexity and avoid whimsy, each test ideally involves changing just one aspect of the estima-
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tions at a time. The tests are summarized in Table 2. The first four groups of tests, relating to the 
controls, the definition of aid and policy, and period length, transfer one specification’s “whimsi-
cal” choices to the others. Next are the tests relating to the definition of export shock, which are 
motivated not by differences among studies but concern about the appropriateness of the original 
authors’ definition. Last are tests that modify the sample by dropping outliers (copying Burnside 
and Dollar’s “whimsical” choice) and/or expanding to new countries and periods. 
Following are more detailed descriptions of the tests: 
1.  Changing the control set. In his discourse on whimsy, the specification choice that Leamer 
worries most about is the choice of regressors. The first set of tests is in this spirit. The stud-
ies examined use a variety of control sets, by which I mean regressors other than aid, the 
variables it is interacted with, and the interaction terms themselves. Burnside and Dollar, 
Collier and Dehn, and Hansen and Tarp control for initial log real GDP/capita; ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, assassinations/capita, and the product thereof; the ICRGE gov-
ernance variable; M2/GDP, lagged; being in sub-Saharan Africa or fast-growing East Asia; 
and fixed period effects. Dalgaard et al. control for about half of those—log real GDP/capita, 
ICRGE, and sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, and period dummies.
7 Guillaumont and Chauvet 
control for a different but equally rich set of variables, namely initial log real GDP/capita, 
mean years of secondary schooling, population growth, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the 
Barro-Lee political instability variable, and period effects. Collier and Dollar opt for a sim-
pler set: initial log real GDP/capita, ICRGE, period effects, and—uniquely—region effects.  
  These four sets of choices give rise to four robustness tests. Each test substitutes a given 
                                                 
7 Dalgaard et al. actually use the listed control set for their OLS and 2SLS regressions. For their system GMM re-
gression, they use only log real GDP/capita and period dummies. But the fuller set is more appropriate for testing the 
regressions from other papers because all but one is OLS or 2SLS, and that one—the Hansen and Tarp GMM re-
gression—is a pure first difference regression in which the additional controls all drop out because they are constant 
  14  
control set for the original one and examines the effect on the significance of key terms. 
  One important comment is in order, which applies to other robustness tests as well. I al-
ways use all complete observations available for developing countries (including the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe). Because different variables are available for different subsets of 
countries, changing the regressor set changes the regression sample. One could perform vari-
ants of the tests that are restricted to the intersections of the old and new samples in an at-
tempt to distinguish the effects of changing sample and changing variables. But this would 
add to the complexity, and the approach I take aims to answer the hypothetical, “What would 
the results have been if the original authors had used alternative controls?” The authors al-
most certainly would have used all available observations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
over time. The slimmer control set causes widespread autocorrelation. 
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Table 2. Robustness Tests 
Test Description 
Changing aid definition   
  
EDA/real GDP  Effective Development Assistance/real GDP, as in Burnside & Dollar, 
Collier & Dehn, Dalgaard et al. 
ODA/real GDP  Net Overseas Development Assistance/real GDP, as in Collier & Dollar, 
Collier & Hoeffler 
ODA/exchange rate GDP 
 
Net Overseas Development Assistance/exchange rate GDP, as in 
Hansen & Tarp, Guillaumont & Chauvet 
Changing policy definition   
INFL, BB, SACW  Inflation, budget balance, and Sachs-Warner openness, as in Burnside & 
Dollar, Collier & Dehn, Hansen & Tarp 2SLS 
INFL, SACW  Inflation and Sachs-Warner, as in Hansen & Tarp GMM 
CPIA 
 





Control for LGDP, ETHNF, ASSAS, ETHNF×ASSAS, ICRGE, M2, SSA, 
EASIA, period effects, as in Burnside & Dollar, Collier & Dehn, Hansen 
& Tarp 
CD controls  Control for LGDP, ICRGE, period and region effects, as in Collier & 
Dollar, Collier & Hoeffler 
GC controls  Control for LGDP, ENV, SYR, POPG, M2, PINSTAB, ETHNF, period ef-
fects, as in Guillaumont & Chauvet 
DHT controls 
 
Control for LGDP, ICRGE, SSA, EASIA, period effects, as in Dalgaard et 
al. 
Changing period length   
12-year  Aggregate over 12-year periods, as in Guillaumont & Chauvet 
 
Changing shock definition   
Pooled distribution  Use one threshold for all countries, rather than country-specific thresh-
olds, that the unpredicted component of commodity export price index 
change must exceed to be a shock  
Shock/GDP  Express shock magnitude as share of GDP rather than price change 
Shock/GDP, pooled distribu-
tion 
Combine above two changes 
 
Changing sample and data set 
 
No outliers  Remove Hadi outliers in the partial scatter of the dependent variable and 
the independent variable of greatest interest 
Expanded sample  New data set. Carried to 2001, except shocks data end in 1997 and Guil-
laumont & Chauvet environment variable not updated 
Expanded sample, no out-
liers 
Combine above two changes 
Expanded sample, AR-
robust 
Use new data; use 5-year periods to eliminate higher-order autocorrela-
tion; instrument almost all variables with one-period lags; cluster 
standard errors by country 
Expanded sample, AR-
robust, no outliers 
Same as previous but removing Hadi outliers 
Abbreviations as in Table 1. 
 
  16  
2.  Redefining aid. All the studies take total aid received as a share of recipient GDP. But there 
are differences in defining both the numerator and denominator of the ratio. Burnside and 
Dollar, Collier and Dehn, and Dalgaard et al. use Effective Development Assistance in the 
numerator while the rest use net ODA. On the choice of denominator, there is also a split. 
Hansen and Tarp and Guillaumont and Chauvet use GDP converted to dollars using market 
exchange rates. The others use real GDP from the Penn World Tables. A country’s relative 
price level strongly correlates with income per head, with the poorest countries having a 
price levels 20–25% that of the United States. Thus, using purchasing power parities instead 
of exchange rates will cause the GDPs of the poorest countries to be measured as relatively 
larger and aid to them as relatively smaller as a share of GDP. It is hard to know a priori what 
effect this change could have on regression coefficients for aid and its interactions, but it 
could be significant. 
  The use of exchange rates seems more appropriate. One way to see this is to ask what the 
local-currency cost is to the recipient of not receiving a quantum of aid. If the aid would be 
spent entirely on tradables, which cost about the same everywhere, then the cost to Sri Lanka 
of not receiving $1 million in aid is the exchange-rate equivalent in rupees. The opposite ex-
treme would occur if the aid would be spent on the representative consumption basket for the 
country, including tradables and nontradables, with all goods and services purchased at do-
nor-economy prices. In this case, the recipient government could purchase the same goods 
and services for far less, so that the value of aid would be greatly inflated going by exchange 
rates, and the PPP adjustment would be appropriate. This case, however, seems quite 
unlikely. By definition, donors must purchase nontradables locally. They may pay above-
market, but probably do not pay close to the donor-economy prices that can be 400% higher 
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or more.
8 In fact, studies of the “tying” of aid—which is when donors require that it be spent 
into the their own economy, on their own tractors or consultants—put the cost increase at 
only 15–30%, not 400% or more (Jepma, 1991). This argues for exchange rates. 
  At any rate, with two options each for measuring aid and GDP, there are four possible 
combinations for aid/GDP. The literature includes three of them (all but EDA/exchange rate 
GDP), and these are the bases for three tests.
9 In fact, EDA/real GDP and ODA/real GDP are 
highly correlated (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001), so switching from one to the other may not 
stress results much. Switching between real and nominal GDP can be expected to impose a 
more difficult test, because the correlations are lower. (See Table 3.) 
Table 3. Simple correlations of aid measures, four-year periods, all available observations 
  EDA/real GDP  ODA/real GDP  ODA/ exchange rate GDP 
EDA/real GDP  1.00     
ODA/real GDP  0.97  1.00   
ODA/exchange rate GDP  0.78  0.82  1.00 
 
3.  Redefining good policy. Three sets of “good policy” variables appear among the tested re-
gressions: 1) Burnside and Dollar’s famous combination of budget balance, inflation, and 
Sachs-Warner openness; 2) inflation and Sachs-Warner only (Hansen and Tarp GMM); and 
3) CPIA alone (Collier and Dollar, Collier and Hoeffler). These generate three robustness 
tests. Using Burnside and Dollar’s coefficients to form policy indexes (6.85 for budget bal-
ance, –1.40 for inflation, and 2.16 for Sachs-Warner), I find that the first two policy defini-
tions are highly correlated, but the third varies more distinctly. (See Table 4.) Switching be-
tween the first two definitions is probably a mild test, but switching between them and CPIA 
a more severe one. To apply the tests, in each case I rerun the Burnside-Dollar–style index-
                                                 
8 If the overall price level in a donor country is five times that of the recipient, but the price level for tradeables is 
about the same in both countries, then the ratio for nontradables must be well above five.  
9 The published EDA data (Chang et al., 1998) cover only 1975–95. I extrapolate EDA to the rest of 1970–2001 via 
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forming regression, which includes all regressors except aid and its interaction terms, then 
use the coefficients on the policy variables to make the index.
10 I include all candidate policy 
variables in the index regardless of their significance in this regression. 
Table 4. Simple correlations of “good policy” measures 
  Inflation, budget bal-
ance, Sachs-Warner 
Inflation, Sachs-Warner  CPIA 





Inflation, Sachs-Warner  0.98  1.00   
CPIA  0.53 0.52 1.00 
 
4.  Changing periodization. All but one of the studies use four-year periods, the exception being 
Guillaumont and Chauvet’s, which uses 12 years. Since I lack higher-frequency observations 
of the Guillaumont and Chauvet environment variable, I cannot test their regression on a 4-
year-period panel. But I test all the other regressions on 12-year panels. Notably, key studies 
in the broader growth literature use periods of 10–25 years despite the small samples that re-
sult
11 (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
a regression of EDA on net ODA, which is available for the whole period. 
10 I compute the constant term in the policy index in the same manner as BD. It is the predicted growth rate in the 
model when the policy variables and the period dummies are zero, and all other variables take their sample-average 
values. 
11 The question of whether the effects measured in four-year regressions are “short-term” is not straightforward to 
answer. On the one hand, very little of the aid in a given P-year period is disbursed right at the start of the period 
and very little of the growth record occurs right at the end. In other words, assuming that aid disbursements are 
spread evenly over time within the period, the average positive lag between two point in time within the period—the 
















For P=4 years, this is 16 months. On the other hand, aid is significantly autocorrelated. I find that the three aid vari-
ables used in this literature have a serial correlation of 0.80–0.85 with 4-year periods. Thus, information about cur-
rent-period aid flows conveys a good deal about previous-period aid. Among the tested regressions, only the Hansen 
and Tarp GMM regression controls for previous-period aid, so the coefficients in all the other regressions actually 
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5.  Changing the definition of shock. This test applies to the Collier and Dehn regression only. 
Their positive and negative shock variables are built from a data set of commodity prices for 
113 developing countries (Dehn, 2000). The definition has two parts: a rule for determining 
whether a change in a country’s aggregate commodity export price index is large and unex-
pected enough to constitute a shock, and a formula for measuring the size of the shock. To 
determine which price movements are shocks, Collier and Dehn examine the residuals from a 
regression based on the following forecasting model: 
it t i t i it y y t y ε β β α α + + ∆ + + = ∆ − − 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 0  
where yit is the commodity export price index for country i in time t and εit is the forecasting 
error. The regression is run separately for each country over 1957–97, and those forecasting 
errors at least 1.96 standard deviations from the mean are considered shocks. The magnitude 
of a shock is then the full price change ∆yit. 
  Two aspects of this definition deserve comment. First, the threshold that the unpredicted 
component of a price movement must exceed to be a “shock” varies by country. This argua-
bly makes sense in that an “unexpected” 20% price change might be routine in one country 
and once-a-century in another. Countries that experience large price changes more frequently 
may adapt to them, so that the effects on growth and poverty would be systematically differ-
ent. On the other hand, this leads to the odd result that countries that are in fact more shock-
prone (in lay terms) do not necessarily experience more “shocks.” To take two extreme ex-
                                                                                                                                                             
reflect effects of past aid too. One can estimate the true average aid-growth lag in these regressions as a weighted 
average involving not just P/3 but terms such as P, 2P, 3P…, with weights ρ, ρ
2, ρ
3…, where ρ is the autocorrela-

















+ + + +
+ + + + P P P P
P
 
For P=4 and ρ=0.81–0.85, this equals 17.3–22.9 years. 
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amples, in South Africa, where the standard deviation of the forecasting error was 4.8% dur-
ing 1957–97, the 11.0% price index increase in 1988 (with a 13.2% forecasting error) is con-
sidered a positive shock. But in Laos, where the standard deviation of forecasting error was 
24.9%, the 32.7% percent drop in 1987 (forecasting error of –48.1%) is not considered a 
shock.  
  Second, the magnitude of the shocks as defined by Collier and Dehn does not take into 
account the economic significance of commodities exports for a country. The growth impact 
of a commodities price shock is probably related to both its magnitude and the share of com-
modity exports in GDP. But the Collier-Dehn definition is purely a measure of price change. 
In contrast, Easterly and Rebello (1993), for example, gauge terms-of-trade shocks relative to 
GDP. 
  I test the Collier and Dehn regressions with two changes that modify these aspects of the 
shock definition—first separately, then together, for a total of three robustness checks. To 
address the concern about the country dependence of shock definition, I pool the forecasting 
errors for all 117 countries in the Dehn (2000) data set, and choose a single 1.96-standard-
error shock threshold, which turns out to be a forecasting error of ±29.5%. To address the 
concern about economic significance, I express the price changes as shares of GDP, using 
1990 data on commodities exports, total exports, and total exports/GDP from Dehn (2000).
12  
 
6.  Removing outliers. The Burnside and Dollar specification I test excludes five observations 
that are a) outliers in aid×policy.and b) highly influential with respect to the coefficient on 
that term. This raises a general question about the extent to which significant results in this 
                                                 
12 This implicitly assumes that the share of exports in GDP remained fixed at 1990 levels throughout the study pe-
riod. This assumption is not completely realistic, but it allows use of Dehn’s data, with its broad coverage, and re-
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literature are driven by outliers. To investigate the role of outliers, I rerun the reproductions 
of the original regressions after excluding outliers. I do the same for the expanded-sample 
versions of the regressions. (See below.) The process for picking outliers is different from 
Burnside and Dollar’s, but less subjective. I apply the Hadi (1992) procedure for identifying 
multiple outliers to the partial scatter of growth with a regressor of particular interest, such as 
aid×policy, using 0.05 as the cut-off significance level.
13 In instrumented regressions, I use 
the variable of interest after projection onto the instruments. 
  I even run this test on the Burnside and Dollar 5/OLS regressions, from which one set of 
outliers is already excluded. Fundamentally, regardless of the genesis of these regressions’ 
results, it is still interesting to determine whether they are driven by a few observations in the 
remaining sample. 
  Outliers are not synonymous with influential observations. Why then focus on outliers? 
For one, even outliers that do not have a high influence on coefficients of interest—what 
standard tests for influence measure—can substantially affect the standard errors of the coef-
ficients, which is at least as important for the present study. In addition, outliers are the ob-
servations most likely to signal measurement problems or structural breaks beyond which the 
core model does not hold—both of which seem better reasons than high influence for exclu-
sion. That said, outliers do not necessarily signal measurement problems or structural break. 
This is especially possible when the variable of interest is highly non-normal, such as the 
Collier and Dehn export price shock variable, which is usually 0 but occasionally takes large 
values. In such cases, outliers may contain valuable information about the development proc-
ess under rare combinations of circumstances. Still, on balance, regression results driven by a 
                                                                                                                                                             
duces any endogeneity of the modified shock variable to growth. 
13 Applying the Hadi procedure directly to a full, many-dimensioned regression data set typically identified 20% or 
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few outliers need to be interpreted with care. 
  The method I use for identifying outliers does not extend straightforwardly to GMM be-
cause the two-dimensional partial scatterplot is a construct without a perfect analogue in the 
GMM setting. Moreover, in system GMM, with parallel equations in levels and differences, 
the notion of an observation itself becomes fuzzy. For these reasons, I do not attempt to iden-
tify and remove outliers from difference and system GMM regressions. Ideally, the combina-
tion of extensive instrumentation and GLS-style reweighting trims and deemphasizes out-
liers.  
 
7.  Expanding the sample. Easterly et al. (2004) develop a new dataset that extends that of Burn-
side and Dollar from 1970–93 to 1970–97 and adds six countries. For the present study, that 
data set has been extended to 2001, pushed back to 1950, expanded to include variables in 
other studies and the literature, and given better coverage of post-Communist Eastern 
Europe. (See Appendix.) I use pre-1970 data only for lagged regressors and instruments, or 
for computing first differences for 1970–73. This data set allows a net expansion in both 
years and countries for all but Guillaumont and Chauvet regression, whose 12-year periods 
and unusual environment variable make extension difficult. (See Table 5.) For example, in 
the case of the Hansen and Tarp 2SLS regression, although 16 of the 231 observations com-
plete in the original data set are incomplete in the new one, the new set has 194 novel obser-
vations, for a total of 409. More sample size information is in Table 14. 
                                                                                                                                                             
more of observations as outliers. 
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Table 5. Overview of differences in regression samples, original and expanded data sets 
  Countries unique to the regression sample  Study period 





Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Myanmar, Papua New 
Guinea, Poland, Republic of Congo, 
Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda 
1970–93  1970–
2001 
Collier & Dehn  “ “
  “ “
  1974–93 1974–97 




Angola, Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, 
Jordan, Liberia, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Papua New 
Guinea, Poland, Republic of Congo, 









Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, China, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Mali, 
Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
Republic of Congo, Romania, Singapore, 
South Africa, Uganda 
1974–93  1970–
2001 
Hansen & Tarp 
GMM  Somalia 
Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Barbados, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, 
Chad, China, Cyprus, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
Poland, Republic of Congo, Romania, 
Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Uganda 
1978–93 “  “ 
Dalgaard et al. None  Bangladesh, Czech Republic, Guinea-Bissau, 
Russia, Singapore, South Africa  1974–97 “  “ 
Guillaumont & 
Chauvet  None
  None 1970–93  1970–93 
B.  Testing the validity of the modified regressions 
I apply up to three specification tests to the modified regressions. The first, which applies to all 
the regressions, is for autocorrelation in the residuals. Autocorrelation can bias coefficients as 
well as standard errors. In the OLS and 2SLS regressions I test, many of the regressors that are 
treated as exogenous—inflation, governance quality, etc.—are potentially affected by past 
growth (predetermined), which would render them endogenous in the presence of autocorrelation 
and bias results. In the GMM regressions, few regressors are treated as exogenous; they are in-
strumented instead. But the instruments are lags of regressors in levels or first differences, which 
can themselves be rendered invalid by autocorrelation of certain orders. To check for autocorre-
lation, I use the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for AR(), which is a flexible test designed for linear 
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GMM regression on panel data with arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation and heteroskedastic-
ity.
14 Since OLS and 2SLS with robust standard errors are special cases of linear GMM, the 
Arellano-Bond test is appropriate for all the regressions I run. For the GMM regressions, I follow 
the usual practice of applying the test to first difference residuals, which can detect autocorrela-
tion in the error component that is purged of fixed country effects (Arellano and Bond, 1991). I 
use a significance threshold of 0.05. 
The second specification test, which applies to all the instrumented regressions, is the 
Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions—also using a significance level of 0.05. Failure on 
this test indicates that an excluded instrument may in fact be a significant growth determinant 
and that its exclusion may be causing omitted variable bias. Unlike the Sargan test of overidenti-
fying restrictions, the Hansen test is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation. 
The third specification “test” is a check on whether the number of instruments in instru-
mented regressions is large. As the instruments become numerous relative to the sample size, 
they can overfit the instrumented variables, biasing the results toward those of OLS (in the case 
of 2SLS) or feasible GLS (in the case of GMM). In the extreme case, where instruments match 
or outnumber observations, the results will match those of OLS or FGLS. However, the literature 
provides little guidance on how many instruments is too many (Ruud, 2000 (p. 515)). Prolifera-
tion of collinear or nearly collinear instruments can also cause the two-step estimate of the co-
variance of the moments, which is the basis for the optimal twos-step GMM weighting matrix, to 
be singular.
15 
                                                 
14 I apply the test to OLS and 2SLS regressions using my “abar” module for Stata. 
15 The two-step weighting matrix is (Z'HZ)
-1, where Z is the instrument matrix and H is a robust proxy for covari-
ance of the errors. Normally in Arellano-Bond/Blundell-Bond estimation rank(H)=N, the number of individuals in 
the panel. This is because H is block diagonal, with one block for each individual. Each block is an outer product 
  25  
Indeed, this appears to have happened in the original Dalgaard et al. regression, and this 
“test” is only relevant for that regression. In Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond GMM regres-
sions, one “GMM-style” instrument is generated for each instrument variable, time period, and 
available lag (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). Instruments can easily num-
ber in the hundreds. Where the Hansen and Tarp GMM specification covers 4 time periods and 
uses at most 1 or 2 lags of 6 instrumenting variables, the newer Dalgaard et al. one covers 6 pe-
riods, imposes no lag limits, and uses 12 instrumenting variables, leading to 303 instruments for 
371 observations in my reproduction.
16 
In performing the “test” of excessive instruments, the rule of thumb I use is that the num-
ber of instruments should not exceed the number of countries in the regression.
17 Typically there 
is an average of 6 observations per country in the variants of the Dalgaard et al. regression that I 
run, so this rule is equivalent to requiring that the ratio of instruments to observations not exceed 
about 0.17. 
If a modified regression fails one of these specification tests, the question then is what to 
do about it. One possible response to an invalid specification is to simply not report the results. 
Another is to report the results but document that they come from an invalid specification. A 
third is to make judicious additional changes to the failing specification so that it passes. I some-
times take the second approach, sometimes the third. On the one hand, searching for additional 
modifications that can allow the specifications to pass tests can rapidly raise the complexity of 
the testing and open the door to whimsy. On the other hand, minimal changes sometimes can 
                                                                                                                                                             
eiei', where ei is the column vector of one-step residuals for individual i. These blocks have rank 1. As the number of 
columns in Z approaches rank(H), the risk of singularity of Z'HZ rises. 
16 In their own paper, the authors note this problem. But they report that limiting the number of lags does not affect 
their results significantly and prefer to report the results from the unlimited regression as simpler, apparently not 
noticing the singular matrix problem. 
17 I thank Henrik Hansen for this rule of thumb. 
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make invalid tests much more meaningful. For example, it useful and relatively un-whimsical to 
limit the number of instruments in variants of the Dalgaard et al. regression. And autocorrelation 
of various orders turns out to be endemic in the results from the sample-expansion test; some ef-
fort at overcoming it makes the results from this important test more useful. 
To be precise, I make three additional changes in order to reduce the number of modified 
regressions that fail specification tests. First, I add the log of initial population as regressor in all 
robustness tests, except for the test that simply drops outliers from the original regression. All the 
2SLS regressions I test use this variable as an instrument for aid because of the well-known bias 
among donors toward small countries. But perhaps because of the economic performance of 
China and India since the early 1990s the variable has picked up significance for growth too, es-
pecially under the sample-expansion test, which extends most of the regression samples to 
2001.
18 This change not only allows many of the modified 2SLS regressions to pass the Hansen J 
test, it also eliminates some occurrences of AR(1). 
Second, I perform a version of the sample-expansion test that incorporates several 
changes to remove or accommodate autocorrelation. I call this the “AR-robust” sample-
expansion test. Autocorrelation of up to order 4 occurs in many of the expanded-sample regres-
sions. For example, the Arellano-Bond test results for AR() of various orders in the Burnside and 
Dollar regression on the enlarged sample are: 





where z is the (normally distributed) test statistic and p is the corresponding two-tailed probabil-
                                                 
18 Except that the data set is only extended to 1997 or the Colliar and Dehn regression, for lack of the shock variable 
after 1997, and not extended at all for the Guillaumont and Chauvet regression, for lack of their environment vari-
able after 1993. 
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ity. The source of this autocorrelation is not obvious. It may be a statistical artifact. Indeed, the 
first change I make to deal with autocorrelation in the sample-expansion test, switching from 
four- to five-year periods, eliminates all the autocorrelation of concern, except for AR(1) in the 
OLS and 2SLS regressions. Having restricted the problem to AR(1) in OLS and 2SLS, I then in-
strument almost all right-hand-side variables in these regressions with their one-period lags in 
order to make the regressions consistent even if these variables are predetermined. I exempt only 
the Collier and Dehn price shock variables, the Collier and Hoeffler post-conflict 1 variable, and 
interaction terms involving them. The shock and post-conflict variables are quite stochastic and 
hard to instrument, and at least the price shock variable should not have a large predetermined 
component. Finally, I report standard errors that are “clustered” on the country identifier, making 
them robust to autocorrelation.
19 
The third change I make to pass specification tests is to limit the number of instruments 
in the Dalgaard et al. regression. In standard difference and system GMM, sets of “GMM-style” 
instruments (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991) embody the expectations: 
2 1 ,   ,   and   each  for    0 L l L l t e w
i
it l t i ≤ ≤ = ∆ ∑ −  
where w is an instrumenting variable, e, is the residual vector, i is the panel index, t the time in-
dex, and L1 and L2 define the range over which lags can be taken. (Typically L1=0 or 1.) Thus 
there is one column in the instrument matrix for each w, t, and l. In testing the Dalgaard et al. 
regression, I find that even setting L2=1 allows too many instruments. I therefore group together 
columns of the instrument matrix that are for the same w and lag distance and combine them by 
addition in order to generate a smaller set of moment conditions, which work out to imply the 
expectations: 
                                                 
19 An alternative approach would be to increase the period length until all autocorrelation disappears—in practice 
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.    , each  for    0 2 1
,
, L l L l e w
t i
it l t i ≤ ≤ = ∆ ∑ −  
I find that when instruments are combined in this way, L2 can take a value of up to 3 without vio-
lating the rule of thumb. So in all tests of the Dalgaard et al. regression, I “collapse” the instru-
ments and set L2=3.
20 
C.  Theoretical issues in interpreting the results 
If Leamer’s (1983) extreme bounds analysis is applied to the results of this testing, then a coeffi-
cient will be deemed robustly different from 0 only if it is significantly different from 0 in every 
test. However, as Sali-I-Martin (1997) argues, this definition of robustness may be too extreme. 
For example, I could test the robustness of a regression by averaging together all observations for 
each global region, generating a sample of some 6 observations. Presumably almost no regres-
sion would pass this test. One could argue that this test is “unfair,” which is to say, too demand-
ing to generate meaningful results. But there is no bright line dividing fair tests from unfair ones. 
Indeed, in this test suite, the 12-year-period test destroys every regression it can be applied to. It 
is not obvious a priori whether this means the test is too strong or the regressions too weak. For 
this reason, as Sali-I-Martin suggests, robustness should be thought of a continuous rather than 
dichotomous concept. Results can be more or less robust. 
Sala-I-Martin offers his own procedure for assessing robustness. In essence, he estimates 
the cumulative distribution function for a coefficient of interest by running a large number of 
variants of the regression it comes from. The robustness of a coefficient is then the fraction of 
the cumulative distribution that is on one or the other side of zero. For example, a coefficient 
would be robustly different from 0 at the conventional level of significance if 95% of its cdf is 
above or below zero. 
                                                                                                                                                             
about eight years. But this would destroy more information than the approach I use. 
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The validity of this inference is based on the assumption, however informal, that the set 
of regressions actually run is a representative sample of all possible variants of the original re-
gression. For the collection of tests assembled here, that assumption does not seem valid. Con-
sider the set of tests that involves varying how total aid receipts are measured. As described 
above, two of the three aid definitions are highly correlated in practice. So regressions that origi-
nally used the third definition are subjected to two nearly identical aid-related tests. Sala-i-
Martin’s algorithm would treat these two tests as distinct, giving them nearly equal weight, rather 
than as what is essentially an unrepresentative oversampling of one test. Similarly, one subset of 
tests, those expanding the sample, cannot be applied to the Guillaumont and Chauvet regression. 
It does not seem plausible that the test suite is representative both with and without this impor-
tant subset of tests. 
In sum, the sampling of specification space that is made here is minimally arbitrary, but 
cannot be assumed to be representative of all possible tests. Thus while Leamer’s definition of 
robustness may be to harsh for this context, Sali-I-Martin’s has its own limitations. This would 
be true even if I performed every possible combination of tests in the suite rather than just one at 
a time. In the end, it seems that human judgment applied to the full set of results must substitute 
for mechanical definitions of robustness. This in turn argues for keeping the number of tests 
small enough for the human mind to embrace. 
III. Results 
In the first step of the testing process, I use the authors’ data sets to reproduce their original re-
sults. (See Tables 6–10. The dependent variable in all the regressions is average annual real 
GDP/capita growth.) All of the reproductions exhibit the same pattern of results as the original 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 I use the “collapse” sub-option of my xtabond2 module for Stata. 
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and all but one have the same sample size.
21 The Burnside and Dollar, Collier and Dehn, and 
Hansen and Tarp reproductions are perfect. Since the purpose of the paper is to test robustness, 
the inexact matches are not a major problem. If the results from the tested regressions are robust, 
they should withstand whatever minor changes in data or specification cause the discrepancies in 
my reproductions. 
I discovered two important specification issues in the original regressions. One was a 
multicolinearity problem in the Collier and Hoeffler regression. In their preliminary regression 
3.1 (not regression 3.4, which is reproduced here), they include the variables post-conflict 1, 
post-conflict 1×policy, and post-conflict 1×aid
2, along with post-conflict 1×aid ×policy. These 
four terms involving post-conflict 1 all have absolute t statistics of 0.5 or less. Collier and Hoef-
fler then search for a specification iteratively, by dropping the least significant of these terms 
one-by-one and rerunning the regression. But in my reproduction of 3.1, post-conflict 
1×aid×policy has a partial correlation of 0.985 with post-conflict 1×aid, making the two statisti-
cally indistinguishable. Thus the Collier and Hoeffler results ought to be interpreted as pertaining 
to either post-conflict 1×aid ×policy or post-conflict 1×aid. Occam’s razor argues for the latter. 
The second has already been mentioned. In the Dalgaard et al. regression, the two-step 
estimated covariance matrix of the moments turns out to be singular.
22 I avoid this problem in 
my reproduction by reducing the number of instruments exactly as described above. My repro-
duction has their key terms still quite significant, and with larger magnitudes than in the original. 
                                                 
21 The Dalgaard et al. regression was executed with the DPD for Ox package. It turns out that an undocumented 
limitation in this software—incomplete observations that create gaps in the time series must always be included in 
the data file rather than deleted—led to a slight mishandling of the data. I use my xtabond2 module for Stata, which 
does not have this limitation. This explains the difference in samples. 
22 The DPD for Ox package computes a generalized inverse in such cases. 
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Log initial real GDP/capita  –0.60 –0.77
  (–1.02) (–1.32)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960  –0.42 –0.35
  (–0.57) (–0.45)
Assassinations/capita  –0.45 –0.37
  (–1.68) (–1.27)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization × As-
sassinations/capita  0.79 0.63
  (1.74) (1.31)
–1.87 –2.08 Sub-Saharan 
 Africa  (–2.41) (–2.83)
1.31 1.21 Fast-growing East Asia 
(2.19) (1.90)
0.69 0.67 Institutional quality (ICRGE) 
(3.90) (3.57)
M2/GDP, lagged  0.01 0.02
  (0.84) (1.12)
Policy  0.71 0.86
  (3.63) (4.23)
Aid/GDP  –0.02 –0.16
  (–0.13) (–1.23)
Aid/GDP×policy  0.19 0.10
  (2.61) (1.70)
Positive shock  0.00
  (0.18)
Negative shock  –0.03
  (–2.38)
0.04 ∆Aid/GDP ×negative shock  
(3.17)
0.00 ∆Aid/GDP ×positive shock 
  (–0.01)
0.01 Aid/GDP, lagged×negative shock 
(1.23)
0.02 Aid/GDP, lagged×positive shock 
  (2.40)
Observations  270 234
R
2  0.39 0.46
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (p value)  0.54 0.88
Period dummies and constant term not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics in parenthesis. En-
tries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
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Log initial real GDP/capita  0.70 0.69
  1.13 1.11
Institutional quality (ICRGE)  0.12 0.14
  0.73 0.93
CPIA  1.16 1.15
  2.89 2.88
Aid/GDP×policy  0.14 0.12
  2.15 1.88
(Aid/GDP)
2  –0.03 –0.03
   2.20 2.20
Aid×policy×post-conflict 1  0.18
  3.92
Observations  344 344
R
2  0.37 0.38
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test (p value)  0.63 0.61
Period and region dummies and constant term not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics in pa-
renthesis. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. Reproduction is not exact, but exhibits the same pattern and 
matches in sample size. 
1As revised in Collier and Hoeffler (2002), regression 1.1, where five erroneous observations were de-
leted. 
 
  33  
Table 8. Reproduction of Hansen and Tarp results 
Regression  1.2 (2SLS) 3.2 (GMM) 
Average annual GDP/capita growth, lagged    –0.37 
  (–7.09) 
Log initial real GDP/capita  0.09 –3.56 
  (0.14) (–1.05) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960  0.11  
  (0.12)  
Assassinations/capita  –0.46 –0.53 
  (–2.02) (–2.31) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization × Assassinations/capita 0.92 1.00 
  (2.17) (2.75) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  –2.25  
  (–2.98)  
Fast-growing E. Asia  1.52  
  (2.42)  
Institutional quality (ICRGE)  0.81  
  (4.57)  
M2/GDP, lagged  0.01  
  (0.55)  
Budget surplus/GDP  9.12  
  (2.49)  
Log (1 + inflation)  –1.13 –0.19 
  (–2.30) (–0.30) 
Sachs-Warner  1.70 2.83 
  (3.36) (4.37) 
Aid/GDP  0.24 0.90 
  (2.34) (4.22) 
(Aid/GDP)
2  –0.01 –0.02 
  (–2.38) (–3.83) 
∆(Aid/GDP)  –0.70 
  (–4.91) 
∆(Aid/GDP)
2  0.01 
   (3.64) 
Observations  231 213 
R
2  0.38  
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p value)  0.76 0.12 
Hansen J (p value)  0.81 0.39 
Period dummies and constant term not reported. Robust t statistics in parenthesis. For GMM, t statistics 
are autocorrelation-robust too, and Arellano-Bond test is for AR(2) in first differences. Some coefficients 
differ from original by a factor of 100 because of scaling changes. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
 
  34  
Table 9. Reproduction of Dalgaard et al. results 
Log initial real GDP/capita  2.03
  (1.67)
Budget surplus/GDP  0.09
  (0.55)




Aid/GDP   1.47
  (4.02)
Aid/GDP × tropical area fraction  –1.33
   (–2.62)
Observations  371
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (p value)  0.37
Hansen J (p value)  0.21
Period dummy and constant term not reported. Unlike in original, to limit the number of instruments, at 
most 3 lags of instrumenting variables are used, and sets of instruments are combined by addition, as 
described in text. t statistics (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust and in-
clude the Windmeijer (2000) finite-sample correction. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
Table 10. Reproduction of Guillaumont and Chauvet 2SLS results 
Log initial real GDP/capita  –2.51
  (–3.11)
Mean years secondary schooling among those over 25  0.93
  (1.16)
Population growth  –0.83
  (–2.64)
M2/GDP, lagged  0.07
  (2.64)
Barro-Lee political instability, lagged  –2.03
  (–1.08)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 1960  –2.13
  (–2.04)









Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p value)  0.08
Hansen J (p value)  0.98
Period dummy and constant term not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics in parenthesis. En-
tries significant at 0.05 in bold.     
 
  35  
I run 86 robustness checks in all. Full results are at <www.cgdev.org>. Here, I report full 
details only for the Burnside and Dollar regressions, as an illustration, and results on key coeffi-
cients for the rest. 
Table 11 shows the full Burnside and Dollar test results. Note first that the testing is not 
nihilistic: some regressors survive all or most of the tests. Dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
fast-growing East Asia, the governance and policy indexes, and the newly added population 
variable are usually significant at or near the 0.05 level, frequently enough that these do appear 
to be true regularities in the data. But aid×policy, the essential term for Burnside and Dollar, is 
more fragile. Switching to the stripped-down control set of Collier and Dollar raises the signifi-
cance level of aid×policy above 0.05. Adopting the Guillaumont and Chauvet controls depresses 
it further, albeit with AR(1). Only the Dalgaard et al. control set, not so different from Burnside 
and Dollar’s original, leaves the key term significant. Changing the definition of aid does reduce 
the coefficient and, though not dramatically, its significance. Switching to the Collier and Dollar 
definition of policy as CPIA completely eliminates the result.
 23 Going to 12-year periods also 
erodes the t statistic. 
In a counterpoint to the focus of Leamer (1983), Levine and Renelt (1992), and Sali-I-
Martin (1997) on the choice of regressors as a source of fragility, it appears that modifying the 
sample affects results much more than modifying the regressor set. Strikingly, removing seven 
additional outliers (Botswana 1978–81, 1982–85, and 1986–89, Gabon 1974–77, Mali 1986–89, 
and Zambia 1986–89 and 1990–93) completely eliminates the result, sending the coefficient on 
aid×policy slightly negative. Expanding the dataset to 2001 and to new countries also gives 
aid×policy a negative but insignificant coefficient. (Easterly et al. (2004) get the same result 
when extending to 1997.) Excluding outliers from the expanded-sample regression actually 
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strengthens this contrary result, so that result is not itself driven by a few outliers. Unfortunately, 
the expanded-sample regressions exhibit autocorrelation of order up to 4. So the final two col-
umns show the results after switching to five-year periods to expunge the higher-order autocorre-
lation, and after instrumenting all variables with their lags and clustering the standard errors by 
country to make the results robust to autocorrelation. Aid×policy remains insignificant. 
The results from the original regression and the “AR-robust,” expanded sample regres-
sion are illustrated in Figure 1, with and without the outliers picked by the Hadi procedure. Each 
graph in the figure shows the partial scatter plot of GDP/capita growth versus aid×policy in the 
5/OLS regression. The two digits in the data point labels indicate the first year of the period for 
each observation. Outliers are marked separately, and two partial regression lines are shown, one 
for the full sample, one for the sample excluding outliers. Note that the second line is not the best 
fit to the non-outlier data points as plotted. Deleting observations causes the estimated coeffi-
cients to shift and all remaining data points in the partial scatter to move. The second line there-
fore is the best fit to the data points in their post-exclusion positions, which are not shown. 
Figure 1 shows that in Burnside and Dollar’s original regression, Botswana had very high 
aid×policy and fairly high growth throughout the 1980s, controlling for the other regressors, 
while Zambia was opposite on both counts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their experiences 
seem to drive the original 5/OLS result on aid×policy. Moreover it seems quite possible that the 
Botswana observations are a case where reverse causality plays a role, with high growth (and 
perhaps good policies) attracting more aid. When aid and aid×policy are instrumented they cease 
to be outliers. (Results not shown.) 
Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 report results on key terms in all the tested regressions. 
Because not all tests were applicable to all regressions, some cells are blank. The test involving 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Ram (2003) performs a similar test. 
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the definition of aid as EDA/real GDP, for example, is not applicable to regressions that origi-
nally use it. Using 12-year periods does not work for the Collier and Hoeffler regression, because 
the definition of their post-conflict 1 variable assumes 4-year periods. Some regressions do not 
have a policy variable and so were exempt from policy-related tests.
24 Lack of higher-frequency 
data for Guillaumont and Chauvet’s environment variable prevents short-period tests. 
Table 12 has results for most of the tests inspired by “whimsical” differences among the 
original regressions. It turns out that the first test, switching to the Burnside and Dollar control 
set, generally reinforces regressions that did not use it in the first place. The Dalgaard et al. sub-
set of the Burnside and Dollar controls has a similar effect, except that it undermines Collier and 
Dehn. The slim Collier and Dollar control set is more destructive, leaving only the Hansen and 
Tarp 2SLS and Dalgaard et al. results significant at 0.05. These, along with Collier and Hoeffler 
and Hansen and Tarp GMM pass the Guillaumont and Chauvet control test. Overall, the Collier 
and Dehn results are most fragile to control changes. 
Altering the definitions of aid proves to be a mild test. As expected, in the first four tested 
regressions, which use real GDP in the denominator of aid, switching between ODA and EDA in 
the aid/GDP numerator has little effect. Changing the denominator turns out not to be a much 
harder test. But changing the definition of policy proves tougher. The Collier and Dehn, Collier 
and Dollar, and Hansen and Tarp regressions are all vulnerable to it to various degrees. Aggre-
gating variables over 12 years is uniformly destructive. The drastic reductions in sample size 
may be the reason, and may make this test “unfair”; on the other hand, several regressors not in-
volving aid pass this test easily in the Burnside and Dollar test results in Table 11. 
Overall, the Collier and Hoeffler result on post-conflict 1×aid×policy (or the collinear 
post-conflict 1×aid), the Hansen and Tarp 2SLS coefficients on aid and aid
2, and the Dalgaard et 
                                                 
24 However, I do take license to stretch their definition of post-conflict 1 to 5-year periods in the “AR-robust” tests. 
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al. results for aid and aid×tropical area fraction persist most under tests inspired by “whimsy” in 
the literature. They are the most whimsy-robust, one could say. Interestingly, except for the Han-
sen and Tarp 2SLS coefficients, all of these relatively strong results center on highly non-normal 
variables. The Collier and Hoeffler post-conflict 1 dummy is 1 for only 13 of the 344 observa-
tions in their original sample. Only 38 of the 234 Collier and Dehn observations have negative 
shocks. In the Dalgaard et al. sample, 233 of the 371 observations have tropical area fraction=1 
and 68 have it 0, leaving 70 in between. Evidently regularities involving such variables are more 
resilient to specification changes.  
The Guillaumont and Chauvet result on aid×environment is also persistent, but is fre-
quently marred by autocorrelation in the tests. (Indeed, the p value for the Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) in my reproduction of the original regression is 0.08, as shown in Table 10.) 
Only Collier and Dehn’s regression included export shocks per se, so only it was sub-
jected to the sensitivity tests relating to that variable. (See Table 13.) The result on 
∆aid×negative shock is robust to the two modifications of the shock definition whether applied 
separately or together. 
Results from sample-modifying tests appear in Table 14. The first two results columns 
are based on regressions on the original authors’ datasets—first for their full sample, second for 
the sample excluding outliers picked by the Hadi algorithm on partial scatterplots. The next pair 
of columns are analogous, but for the expanded data set. Autocorrelation is prevalent in the ex-
panded-sample results. So the final pair of columns shows the results from making expanded-
sample regressions “AR-robust.” 
Except for the Guillaumont and Chauvet result, all the original OLS and 2SLS results de-
pend on outliers for some or all of their significance. The dependence is particularly heavy for 
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the regressions involving aid×policy. On the other hand, the lack of significance of most of the 
coefficients under the sample-expansion test is not driven by new, wayward outliers. Excluding 
them does not restore significance. (See Figures 1–8.)  
The weakest results again are those on aid×policy, from Burnside and Dollar, Collier and 
Dollar, and Collier and Dehn. The Collier and Dehn coefficient on ∆aid×negative shock is 
stronger—arguably stronger than a glance at the table suggests. The coefficient is dramatically 
reversed by the exclusion of outliers from the original sample. So it would seem that, leaving 
aside extreme observations, increasing aid to countries undergoing such shocks slows growth. 
However, shocks are by definition outlier events. The 10 outliers identified in the Collier and 
Dehn original-sample regression include 8 of the 38 negative shock episodes in the sample. It 
may be inconsistent therefore to draw conclusions about the role of shocks in growth having ex-
cluded many of the most dramatic examples. On the other hand, 30 shock episodes remain even 
after excluding outliers.  
Two regressions without such stochastic terms go relatively unscathed in the first four 
columns of Table 14. The Guillaumont and Chauvet result goes relatively unscathed but also 
relatively untested because I am not able to expand its sample. I do nearly double the sample of 
the Hansen and Tarp 2SLS regression, and it does comparatively well in the first four columns. 
The coefficients on aid and aid
2 achieve similar values and t statistics in the expanded sample as 
in the original, and the significance is not dependent on outliers.  
However, all these expanded-sample results are in some doubt because all fail autocorre-
lation tests at 0.05 or 0.06. In the face of specification problems that can bias results, one can err 
on the side of inclusion—taking the regressions as they are, caveat emptor—or exclusion—
purging the data of biasing information, but along with it, probably, information that is both rel-
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vant and non-biasing. Table 14 does both. Specifically, its final pair of columns shows the results 
of making the sample-expansion regressions “AR-robust”—using 5-year periods and autocorre-
lation-robust standard errors, and instrumenting most variables with their lags. All the OSL and 
2SLS results that can be put to this test fail it. But again, though tough, the test is not inherently 
nihilistic. In the Burnside and Dollar regression, both the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy and the 
institutional quality index survived this test. 
Meanwhile, the two GMM regressions are, if anything, revivified by the AR-robust sam-
ple-expansion test. Of course for these regressions, which already instrument most right-hand-
side variables and have autocorrelation-robust standard errors, the AR-robust test consists only in 
switching from 4- to 5-year periods in order to expunge higher-order autocorrelation that can 
render instruments invalid. So the test for these regressions is arguably less severe. Nevertheless, 
the overall pattern is striking. The most methodologically conservative regressions tested pro-
duce coefficients in the expanded sample that, though smaller, are significant at or near 0.05 and 
consistent with the authors’ original results. Of these, the Dalgaard et al. results also pass almost 
all the “whimsy”-inspired tests (Table 12), the only exception being the 12-year test. 
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Table 11. Robustness tests of Burnside and Dollar regression 
   Changing controls Changing aid  Changing sample 
Changing policy 
 Changing 
periods  New data  New data, AR-robust
 
Origi-




















1 No  outliers
–0.60 –0.37 –0.05 –0.43 –0.30 –0.32 –0.39 –0.50  –0.61 –1.01 –0.39 –0.49 –1.16 –0.90 Log initial real 
GDP/capita  (–1.02)  (–0.65)  (–0.11) (–0.78) (–0.52) (–0.57) (–0.69) (–0.90)  (–1.06) (–1.90) (–1.14) (–1.39) (–1.90) (–1.75)
–0.42    –1.10   –0.86 –0.93 –0.93 –0.83  –0.36 –0.54 –0.80 –0.72 –0.51 –0.41 Ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalization  (–0.57)     (–1.62)   (–1.12) (–1.18) (–1.21) (–1.15)  (–0.34) (–0.73) (–1.19) (–1.09) (–0.47) (–0.39)
–0.45       –0.50 –0.47 –0.47 –0.36  –0.30 –0.40 –0.39 –0.39 0.19 0.05 Assassinations/ 
capita  (–1.68)       (–1.88) (–1.74) (–1.74) (–1.22)  (–0.99) (–1.41) (–1.65) (–1.62) (0.44) (0.14)
0.79       0.87 0.82 0.77 0.51  0.49 0.69 0.26 0.24 –0.84 –0.44 Ethnic × Assas. 
(1.74)       (1.98) (1.85) (1.68) (0.98)  (0.68) (1.50) (0.41) (0.38) (–0.77) (–0.51)
–1.87     –2.28 –1.68 –1.48 –1.80 –1.81  –1.71 –2.28 –1.20 –1.37 –1.83 –1.77 Sub–Saharan Africa 
(–2.41)     (–3.58) (–2.38) (–2.06) (–2.55) (–2.76)  (–2.00) (–3.26) (–2.20) (–2.56) (–2.74) (–2.73)
1.31     0.89 0.78 0.82 0.84 1.55  1.09 1.04 0.74 0.65 1.64 1.37 Fast–growing E. Asia 
(2.19)     (1.53) (1.31) (1.36) (1.37) (2.51)  (1.48) (1.81) (1.45) (1.27) (1.69) (1.56)
0.69  0.67  0.71 0.63 0.63 0.15  0.64 0.67 0.38 0.36 0.44 0.43 Institutional quality 
(ICRGE)  (3.90)  (3.71)  (0.71) (3.48) (3.41) (0.74)  (3.30) (3.74) (3.56) (3.38) (3.02) (3.21)
0.01     0.04   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 M2/GDP, lagged 
(0.84)     (2.68)   (1.01) (1.01) (0.75) (0.69)  (1.84) (0.62) (0.54) (0.86) (1.03) (0.99)
0.71  0.91  0.92 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.79    0.78 0.89 1.34 1.40 0.45 0.77 Policy 
(3.63)  (4.66)  (7.57) (3.93) (4.16) (3.84) (4.31)    (3.07) (4.53) (5.65) (5.92) (0.74) (1.56)
     –0.01            Mean years secon-
dary schooling        (–0.04)           
     –0.01            Population growth 
      (–0.06)           
     –0.61            Political instability, 
lagged        (–0.94)           
–0.02  0.17  0.01 0.16 0.16 0.04 –0.24 0.07  –0.12 0.06 0.31 0.41 –0.89 0.14 Aid 
(–0.13)  (0.88)  (0.07) (0.73) (0.80) (0.72) (–0.73) (0.46)  (–0.52) (0.26) (1.15) (1.40) (–0.98) (0.18)
0.19  0.13  0.06 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.00  0.12 –0.05 –0.15 –0.28 0.39 –0.19 Aid × policy 
(2.61)  (1.73)  (1.06) (2.27) (1.95) (1.63) (2.32) (0.01)  (1.31) (–0.45) (–1.04) (–1.54) (0.97) (–0.45)
   0.18  0.49 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.27  0.17   0.40 0.40 0.10 0.22 Log population 
   (1.18)  (3.73) (2.28) (2.50) (2.44) (2.52) (1.67)  (0.85)   (3.19) (3.25) (0.41) (1.06)
Observations 270  278  262 278 275 272 268 264 97 263 430 420 287 276
R
2 0.39  0.43  0.41 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.61 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40
AR(1) (p value)  0.54  0.48  0.05 0.24 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.92 0.31 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.13
1Regression fails Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) at 0.05 for either the full regression sample or that excluding residual–lagged residual outliers.  
Period dummies and constant term not reported. All t statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust; those in last two columns also robust to arbitrary pat-
terns of autocorrelation. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
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Table 12. Coefficients on key terms under specification-modifying tests (original data set) 
       Changing controls  Changing aid  Changing policy 























SACW CPIA  12-year
0.19     0.13 0.06
1 0.19   0.14 0.05   0.26  0.00 0.12 Aid × 
policy  (2.61)     (1.73)  (1.06) (2.27)   (1.95) (1.63)   (3.02)  (0.01) (1.31) Burnside 
& Dollar 
 270     278  262 278   275 272   296  264 97
0.10     0.03  0.02 0.04   0.06 0.02   0.09  0.15 –0.02 Aid × 
policy  (1.76)     (0.46)  (0.51) (0.61)   (1.02) (1.33)   (1.65)  (1.07) (–0.16)
0.04     0.02  0.02 0.02   0.03 0.01   0.03  0.02 0.01







234     242  227 242   281 281   256  268 51
0.14  0.21   –0.01 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.06    0.19 Aid × 
policy  (2.15)  (2.87)    (–0.24) (2.71) (1.72) (1.65) (1.44) (1.19)    (1.64) Collier & 
Dollar 
   344  337    374 349 349 347 351 388    119
0.18  0.16   0.11
1 0.16
1 0.30 0.04 0.15 0.18
1     




1 × aid 
× policy 
344  337    374 349 349 347 351 388     
0.24     0.32  0.38 0.39
1 0.74 1.00   0.24  0.11
3 0.20 Aid 
(2.34)     (2.75)  (3.81) (3.27) (1.85) (2.99)   (2.61)  (1.45) (1.13)
–0.01    –0.01 –0.01 –0.01






(–2.38)     (–2.60)  (–2.94) (–3.07) (–1.16) (–2.33)   (–2.51)  (–1.31) (–1.14)
  231     232  206 232 231 231     264  216 50
0.90   1.04 1.12 1.04 –0.05 2.20 0.91  1.01   Aid 
(4.22)   (1.64) (3.04) (1.64) (–0.03) (1.59) (2.01)  (1.46)  
–0.02   –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 0.06 –0.13 –0.02  –0.02   Aid
2  (–3.83)   (–1.07) (–2.41) (–1.07) (0.16) (–1.04) (–1.45)  (–0.49)  
–0.70   –0.52 –0.71 –0.52 –0.83 –1.79 –0.80  –0.86   ∆Aid  (–4.91)   (–1.50) (–1.93) (–1.50) (–0.96) (–1.92) (–2.51)  (–1.88)  
0.01   0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.01  0.01   ∆(Aid





    213   213 181 213 214 214 213  215  
1.47  1.37  1.47  1.34     0.76 0.29      0.15 Aid 
(4.02)  (3.50)  (2.99)  (2.69)     (4.20) (3.32)      (0.02)
-1.33 –1.73 –1.70 –1.55     –0.87 –0.23      –2.30








371  354  371  315     371 365      116
–0.15 –0.16
 –0.15  –0.12 –0.49
1 –0.35
1   –0.16
1 –0.15
1  –0.14  






ronment  68  71  73    73 66 66   66 68  69  
1Regression fails Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) at 0.05 significance level for either the full regression sam-
ple or that excluding residual–lagged residual outliers. 
2Regression fails Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) at in 
first differences at 0.05. 
3Regression fails Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions at 0.05. 
All t statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust; those for GMM regressions also autocorrelation-robust. Ex-
cept for original Hansen and Tarp regression, all GMM standard errors include the Windmeijer (2000) fi-
nite-sample correction. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
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Table 13. Coefficients on key terms in Collier and Dehn regression under tests of shock 
definition 
Distribution of fore-
casting errors used 















0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04 Aid × policy 
(1.76) (1.06) (1.00) (0.91)
0.04  0.18 0.03 0.50 ∆Aid × negative 
shock  (3.17)  (1.96) (2.35) (4.25)
Observations  234 234 234 234
Heteroskedasticity-robust t statistics in parenthesis. Those significant at 0.05 in bold. First results column 
is for original specification. 
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Table 14. Coefficients on key terms under data set–modifying tests 





















1  –0.19 Aid × policy 
(2.61) (–0.45) (–1.04) (–1.54) (0.97) (–0.45) B&D 5/OLS 
Observations  270 263 430 420 287 276
0.10 0.11 0.03
1 0.01
1 0.16 0.35 Aid × policy 
(1.70) (1.11) (0.58) (0.05) (1.39) (1.81)
0.04 –0.06 0.03
1 –0.16
1 0.01 0.03 ∆Aid × nega-
tive shock  (3.17) (–1.33) (2.54) (–1.75) (0.64) (0.32)
Collier & Dehn 
Observations  234 224 388 364 297 279
0.14 0.07 0.00
1 –0.02
2 –0.03 –0.03 Aid × policy 
(2.15) (1.06) (0.06) (–0.30) (–0.43) (–0.58) Collier & Dollar 
Observations  344 341 521 506 296 291
0.18 1.18 0.08
1 –0.10
2 0.09 0.22 Post-conflict 1 
× aid × policy (3.92) (2.12) (2.12) (–0.29) (0.96) (0.43) Collier & Hoeffler 
Observations  344 333 521 495 296 287
0.24 0.15 0.18
1 0.18
1 –0.01 –0.02 Aid 
(2.34) (1.82) (2.35) (2.13) (–0.07) (–0.20)
–0.01 –0.005 –0.01
1 –0.01
1 0.00 0.00 Aid
2 
(–2.38) (–1.90) (–2.28) (–1.43) (0.27) (0.38)
Hansen & Tarp 2SLS 
Observations  231 229 409 406 294 293
0.90  0.16
3  0.29    Aid 
(4.22) (0.81)  (1.86)   
–0.02 –0.002
3  –0.01    Aid
2 
(–3.83) (–1.01)  (–1.95)   
–0.70 –0.18
3   –0.30    ∆Aid 
(–4.91) (–1.12)   (–2.43)   
0.01 0.002
3   0.01    ∆(Aid
2) 
(3.64) (1.08)   (2.19)   
Hansen & Tarp GMM 
Observations  213  516   381   
1.47 0.19
4   0.41    Aid 
(4.02) (2.60)   (4.39)   
-1.33 –0.10
4   –0.39    Aid × tropical 
area fraction  (-2.62) (–1.30)   (–3.73)   
Dalgaard et al. GMM 
Observations  371  450   343   
–0.15 –0.11      Aid × environ-
ment  (–1.79) (–1.96)      Guillaumont & Chauvet 
Observations  68 67     
1Regression fails Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) at 0.05 for either the full regression sample or that exclud-
ing residual–lagged residual outliers. 
2Fails same test at 0.06. 
3Regression fails test for AR(3) in first-
differences at 0.002, rendering several instruments invalid. 
4Regression fails test for AR(3) and AR(4) in 
first-differences at 0.05, rendering several instruments invalid. 
All t statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust; those in last two columns or in GMM regressions also auto-
correlation-robust. Except for original Hansen and Tarp regression, all GMM standard errors include the 
Windmeijer (2000) finite-sample correction. Entries significant at 0.05 in bold. 
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-10 -5 0 5 10
Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.19, t = 2.61, N = 270
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.05, t = -0.45, N = 263
 
Expanded sample, AR-robust 















































































































































































































































































-2 -1 0 1 2
Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.39, t = 0.97, N = 287
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.19, t = -0.45, N = 276
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-50 0 50 100
Change in Aid*Negative Shock
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.04, t = 3.17, N = 234
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.06, t = -1.33, N = 224
 




























































































































































































































































































-100 -50 0 50 100
Change in Aid*Negative Shock
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.01, t = 0.64, N = 297
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = 0.03, t = 0.32, N = 279
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-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.14, t = 2.15, N = 344
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = 0.07, t = 1.06, N = 341
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-10 0 10 20 30
Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = -0.03, t = -0.43, N = 296
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.03, t = -0.58, N = 291
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Figure 4. Collier & Hoeffler regression: Partial scatter of GDP/capita growth vs. Post-
conflict 1×aid ×policy 
Original data 
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Post-conflict*Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.18, t = 3.92, N = 344
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = 1.18, t = 2.12, N = 333
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-10 0 10 20 30
Post-conflict*Aid*Policy
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.09, t = 0.96, N = 296
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = 0.22, t = 0.43, N = 287
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-10 -5 0 5
Aid, instrumented values
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = 0.24, t = 2.34, N = 231
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = 0.15, t = 1.82, N = 229
 






















































































































































































































































































-10 -5 0 5
Aid, instrumented values
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = -0.01, t = -0.07, N = 294
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.02, t = -0.20, N = 293
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-15 -10 -5 0 5 10
Aid*Environment, instrumented values
Non-outliers Fit to all data, coef = -0.15, t = -1.79, N = 68
Outliers Fit excl. outliers, coef = -0.11, t = -1.96, N = 67
 
IV. Conclusion 
Each of the papers examined here embodies a set of choices about model specification and data. 
Aid is measured a certain way. A certain epoch is studied. Periods have a certain length. And so 
on. Some of these choices imply certain assumptions about the world, such as, say, that aid is not 
endogenous to growth. All limit the scope of a strict interpretation of the results. 
To wit, the Burnside and Dollar results can be stated more precisely as follows: 
Aid was associated with higher GDP growth in a good policy environment during 1970–93, on 
average, in countries and periods where the necessary data was collected, except for outliers 
(unless aid
2×policy is included to allow for diminishing returns to aid), when aid is defined as 
“Effective Development Assistance” as a share of real GDP and polices are defined by inflation, 
budget deficit, and the complex Sachs-Warner “openness” variable, controlling for log of initial 
real GDP/capita, assassinations per capita, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the product of 
those two, money supply/GDP, and period effects, assuming that no unobserved country-specific 
effects simultaneously and substantially influence aid, policies, and growth, and no variables 
other than aid aid×policy are endogenous to growth. 
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This is not quite “aid has a positive effect on growth in a good policy environment.” 
In fairness, such qualifiers could be tacked on to the conclusion of any study in the cross-
country literature on aid and development, or in econometrics more generally (though perhaps 
not always quite so many). Moreover, Burnside and Dollar did test some of their assumptions, 
such as the exogeneity of the policy variables. Nevertheless, a question of great scientific and 
practical importance remains, and it is how many of such implied qualifiers in studies of aid and 
growth can be dropped without harming the conclusions. This study attempts to contribute to an-
swering that question. 
The test results reported here suggest that the fragility found in Easterly et al. (2004) for 
the case of Burnside and Dollar is common in the cross-country aid effectiveness literature. 
In surveying the results, it is tempting to ask which results are robust and which are not. 
But the test data are best seen in shades of grey. The results tested here break roughly into five 
groups, ranging from weakest to strongest. The weakest group consists of the results on 
aid×policy in the Burnside and Dollar, Collier and Dollar, and Collier and Dehn regressions, 
which lose significance at 0.05 in all but the weakest tests. In the second division I put the Col-
lier and Dehn result on ∆aid×negative shock, which passes more tests but is quite sensitive to 
changes in the control set, as well as to removal of a minority of the negative shocks in the sam-
ple. The Collier and Hoeffler result on post-conflict 1×aid×policy (or the collinear post-
conflict 1×aid), the Hansen and Tarp results on aid and aid
2, and Guillaumont and Chauvet result 
on aid×environment seem stronger. They generally pass the “whimsy”-based tests at or near 
0.05. Most survive the sample-expansion test, but with autocorrelation—and then fail the AR-
robust test meant to address this problem. The Guillaumont and Chauvet result could not be put 
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to the sample-expansion tests, so the degree of its robustness is less certain and I add it to this 
middle category. 
In the fourth and fifth categories are the GMM results of Hansen and Tarp and Dalgaard 
et al., respectively. Both fare well under the sample expansion. The Hansen and Tarp GMM re-
sults, especially those on aid and lagged aid, generally persist through the test suite, though not 
always significantly at 0.05. The only test that completely eliminates the Hansen and Tarp GMM 
results is that of defining aid as EDA/real GDP, but this is a misleading measure of aid. As for 
the Dalgaard et al. results, they come through powerfully in all the tests but the 12-year aggrega-
tion that reduces the sample size to 116. 
Does this mean that the statistically weaker stories of aid effectiveness should be dis-
missed? Are recipient policies, exogenous economic factors, and post-conflict status irrelevant to 
aid effectiveness? No. There can be no doubt that aid sometimes finances investment (Hansen 
and Tarp, 2001), and that domestic policies, governance, external conditions, and historical cir-
cumstances influence the productivity of investment. Why then do such stories of aid effective-
ness not shine more clearly through the numbers? The reasons are several. Aid is probably not a 
fundamentally decisive factor for development, not as important as, say, domestic savings, ine-
quality, and governance. Moreover, foreign assistance is not homogenous. It consists of every-
thing from in-kind food aid to famine-struck countries and technical advice on building judiciar-
ies to loans for paving roads. And some aid is poorly used. Thus the statistical noise nearly 
drowns out the signal. 
If there is one strong conclusion from this literature it is that on average aid works well 
outside the tropics but not in them. But just as it would be a mistake to conclude that the other 
stories of aid effectiveness contain no truth, it would also be mistaken to conclude that this result 
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is the wholly, simply true. Indeed, the Dalgaard et al. result is more of a question than an answer. 
Presumably distance from the poles is not a direct determinant of aid effectiveness. Rather, the 
causal pathways are complex, and so it cannot be assumed that no kind of aid will work well in 
the tropics. Much the same can be said about the more optimistic, but somewhat less robust, 
Hansen and Tarp result on the overall positive effect of aid on growth. Even accepting it as true, 
it gives little guidance about where aid ought to be sent, and in what forms. 
Perhaps further econometric work will disaggregate aid by types of program and recipient 
and unearth more robust answers to the fundamental questions of aid policy. Or perhaps re-
searchers have hit the limits of what cross-country empirics can reveal about aid. The search for 
truth may need to rely more on the particularistic case study approach. Van de Walle and Johns-
ton (1996), for example, synthesize conclusions from case studies on the use and effects of aid in 
seven African countries, each jointly conducted by researchers from donor and recipient coun-
tries. Of course, the lessons that emerge from case studies are particular to the country studied. 
But they can be generalized. Killick (1998) provides an excellent example by conducting a sys-
tematic survey of case studies that feeds into a trenchant analysis of the effects of IMF condi-
tionality. Nevertheless, robust generalizations will not come easily. 
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Appendix. Data set construction 
The new data set used in this study is based heavily on that for Easterly et al. (2004). Some vari-
ables in that set have been slightly revised. Others have been added to match the data sets of the 
tested regressions. The period of coverage has been pushed back to 1958 and extended forward 
to 2001 for most variables. All data were collected from standard cross-country sources, expect 
for countries’ export price indexes, which were provided by Jan Dehn (see Dehn (2000)). (See 
Table A–1.) 
 
Following are notes on the data set construction: 
 
(a)  Revisions since Easterly et al. (2004) 
•  Some observations for inflation were completed by using wholesale inflation where con-
sumer price inflation was unavailable. 
•  The update of the Sachs-Warner variable was slightly revised under the influence of the 
independent update by Wacziarg and Welch (2002). The full update will be described and 
published separately. 
•  Some missing values for Effective Development Assistance during 1975–95, the period 
of the EDA data set, were filled in in the same manner as missing values outside this pe-
riod already were, via a regression of EDA on net ODA. 
•  ICRGE now varies over time, rather than taking 1982 values throughout. Observations 
before 1982 were assigned 1982 values. In addition, the variable was revised in order to 
extend it beyond 1997. In 1998, the PRS Group stopped reporting two of ICRGE’s origi-
nal components, Expropriation Risk and Repudiation of Government Contracts. So these 
were dropped entirely from ICRGE, leaving Corruption, Bureaucratic Quality, and Rule 
of Law. On annual data, the revised ICRGE has a 0.97 correlation with the original. 
•  Missing values for ethnolinguistic fractionalization were filled in from Roeder (2001). 
 
(b)  Expansion of period 
•  Data was collected for all available years in 1958–2001. 
•  However, the Collier and Dehn shocks variables were only updated to 1997 because the 
underlying data on export prices from Dehn (2000) cease in 1997. 
•  The Guillaumont and Chauvet environment variable was not updated at all, for lack of 
underlying data on its four components. 
•  The 1998–2001 values for the updated Sachs-Warner variable are based on 1998 data 
only. Currency Data International, the long-time source of black market premium data, 
which is one component of Sachs-Warner, shut down in 1999. 
 
Table A–1. Construction of data set 




GDPG World  Bank,  2003   
Initial GDP per 
capita 
LGDP  Summers and Heston, 
1991, updated using 
GDPG 
Natural logarithm of 
GDP/capita for first year of 
period; constant 1985 dol-





ETHNF  Roeder, 2001  Probability that two indi-
viduals will belong to dif-
ferent ethnic groups 
Assassinations/ 
capita 
ASSAS Banks,  2002  Assassinations/capita 
Political instabil-
ity, lagged 




ICRGE  PRS Group’s IRIS III 
data set (see Knack 
and Keefer, 1995) 
Revised version of vari-
able. Computed as the av-
erage of the three compo-




M2–1 World  Bank,  2003   
Sub-Saharan Af-
rica 
SSA  World Bank, 2003  Codes nations in the south-
ern Sahara as sub-Saharan 
East Asia  EASIA    Dummy for China, Indone-
sia, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand, 
following Burnside and 
Dollar 
Budget surplus  BB  World Bank, 2003; 
IMF, 2003 
World Bank primary data 
source. Additional values 
extrapolated from IMF, 
using series 80 and 99b 
(local-currency budget sur-
plus and GDP) 
Inflation INFL  World  Bank,  2003; 
IMF, 2003 
Natural logarithm of 1 + 
inflation rate. World Bank 
primary data source. 
Wholesale price inflation 
from IMF used where con-




SACW  Sachs and Warner, 
1995; Easterly et al., 
2004; Wacziarg and 
Welch, 2002 
Extended to 1998. Slightly 
revised pre-1993. Full de-
scription will be published 
separately 
Positive (and 
negative) shock  
POSSHOCK 
NEGSHOCK 
Dehn, 2000  Shocks are % price index 
changes. “Shock” threshold 
country-specific. Recon-
structed based on underly-






  Shocks are shares of GDP, 
computed using 1990 data 
on commodity share of ex-
ports and exports share of 
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  Shocks are % price 













tance/ real GDP 
AID Chang  et al., 1998; 
DAC, 2002; IMF, 
2003; World Bank, 
2003; Summer and 
Heston, 1991 
Available values for 1975–
95 from Chang et al. Miss-
ing values extrapolated 
based on regression of 
EDA on Net ODA. Con-
verted to 1985 dollars with 
World Import Unit Value 
index from IMF, series 75. 





ODAPPPGDP  DAC, 2002; IMF, 
2003; World Bank, 
2003; Summer and 
Heston, 1991 
Like AID exception using 





ODAXRGDP DAC,  2002;  World 
Bank, 2003 
. 
Dummy for end 
of civil conflict in 
previous period 
POSTCONFLICT1  Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002 
 
      
Tropical area 
fraction 
TROPICAR  Gallup and Sachs, 
1999 
 
Population  LPOP  World Bank, 2003  Natural logarithm 
Population 
growth 
POPG World  Bank,  2003   
Mean years of 
secondary school-
ing among those 
over 25 




ARMS-1  U.S. Department of 
State, various years 
 
1All variables aggregated over time using arithmetic averages. 
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